---
id: "question-board-bottleneck"
type: "open-question"
source_timestamps: ["§ Don't Give Negotiators Decision Authority"]
tags: ["scalability", "decision-making"]
related: ["action-strip-commitment-authority", "concept-consultation-funnel", "claim-zero-authority-empowers", "framework-dvb-lifecycle"]
resolutionPath: "Case studies on the operational cadence of Deal Value Boards (DVBs) at scale, measuring the cycle time of final approvals when the 'consultation funnel' is properly implemented."
sources: ["ecosystem"]
sourceVaultSlug: "hbr-seg-ecosystem"
originDay: 11
articleStem: "hbr-nm-103-big-companies-negotiate-deals"
sourceUrl: "https://hbr.org/2026/01/why-big-companies-struggle-to-negotiate-great-deals"
sourceTitle: "Why Big Companies Struggle to Negotiate Great Deals"
---
# Does removing commitment authority create an executive bottleneck?

**Open question:** If frontline negotiators are stripped of all binding commitment authority (see [[action-strip-commitment-authority]], [[claim-zero-authority-empowers]]) and must bring proposed business plans back to a small group of final decision-makers, how does an enterprise scale this across *hundreds* of complex deals without the final decision-makers becoming a massive bottleneck?

**Resolution path:** Case studies on the operational cadence of [[concept-deal-value-board|DVBs]] at scale, measuring the cycle time of final approvals when the [[concept-consultation-funnel]] is properly implemented.

**Enrichment note:** This is the article's own acknowledged tension and is reinforced by the mainstream counter-view that concentrating authority risks stalls; the practical mitigations are strong process design, decision SLAs, and the funnel's front-loading of concerns so late-stage approvals are fast. Tracked across the [[framework-dvb-lifecycle]].