---
id: "action-leverage-lobbying"
type: "action-item"
source_timestamps: ["§ Opportunities"]
tags: ["government-relations", "regulation"]
related: ["contrarian-lobbying-as-moat"]
action: "Invest in government relations to influence legislation that slows or redirects AI automation in regulated industries."
outcome: "Extended lifecycle of current competitive advantages through regulatory protection."
speakers: ["Toby E. Stuart"]
sources: ["futures"]
sourceVaultSlug: "hbr-seg-futures"
originDay: 2
articleStem: "hbr-nm-99-genai-end-incumbent-advantage"
sourceUrl: "https://hbr.org/2024/11/could-gen-ai-end-incumbent-firms-competitive-advantage"
sourceTitle: "Could Gen AI End Incumbent Firms’ Competitive Advantage?"
---
# Leverage Lobbying for Regulatory Capture

**Action.** Invest in government relations to influence legislation that slows or redirects AI automation in regulated industries.

**Detail.** In highly regulated industries (law, medicine, unionized sectors), technological disruption can be slowed through **policy**. Companies should invest in government relations and lobbying to influence legislation in their favor, effectively using the legal system to preserve their economic interests against AI-automation trends. This operationalizes [[contrarian-lobbying-as-moat|the claim that lobbying is a primary strategic moat]].

**Outcome.** Extended lifecycle of current competitive advantages through regulatory protection.

*(Enrichment: non-market-strategy literature supports that incumbents in healthcare, finance, and utilities use lobbying and regulation to slow disruption; but framing it as a *primary* moat is normative, and regulatory capture may provoke backlash, reform, or antitrust action — a potentially unstable moat.)*