---
id: "claim-sk-hynix-vulnerability"
type: "claim"
source_timestamps: ["00:09:18"]
tags: ["semiconductors", "supply-chain"]
related: ["entity-sk-hynix", "entity-samsung-electronics", "entity-korea-international-trade-association", "question-fab-inventory-survival"]
confidence: "high"
testable: true
speakers: ["Nate B. Jones"]
enrichment_verdict: "Partially supported — South Korea imports ~40–60% of helium from Middle East (Qatar/Algeria), diversified to US/Russia post-2022. SK Hynix/Samsung hold 3–6 months inventory; no total loss reported."
sources: ["s50-helium-48-days"]
sourceVaultSlug: "s50-helium-48-days"
originDay: 50
---
# SK Hynix and Samsung lost 2/3 of their helium supply

According to the [[entity-korea-international-trade-association]], South Korea imported **two-thirds of its helium from Qatar in 2025**. With Qatar's supply offline, [[entity-sk-hynix]] and [[entity-samsung-electronics]] — the world's largest memory chip manufacturers — have effectively lost the majority of their helium supply, directly threatening HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) production used in AI accelerators.

**Enrichment**: Partially supported. The 'two-thirds from Qatar in 2025' figure trends high; the more defensible range is 40–60% of helium imports from the Middle East (Qatar plus Algeria), with substantial diversification to US and Russian suppliers since 2022. SK Hynix and Samsung hold roughly 3–6 months of inventory and no HBM production halts have been publicly reported. See [[question-fab-inventory-survival]].

The directional vulnerability is real; the magnitude framed by the speaker is the worst-case rather than the median scenario.
